To address the question as to whether managers manipulate accounting numbers downwards prior to management buyouts (MBOs), we implement an industry-adjusted buyout-specific approach and receive an affirmative answer. In UK buyout companies, negative earnings manipulation (understating the earnings prior to the deal) often occurs, both by means of accrual management and real earnings management. We demonstrate that MBOs are significantly more frequently subject to negative manipulation than leveraged buyouts (LBOs). In non-buyout firms, positive earnings management frequently occurs because it affects managers' bonuses and the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts' expectations which may trigger a positive market reaction. By means of an instrumental variables approach, we examine competing incentives affecting the degree and size of earnings manipulation. Our evidence implies that the (ex ante) perceived likelihood that an MBO will be undertaken has a strong significant effect on negative earnings management, while the external borrowing capacity of the buyout company is not determined by standard capital structure factors, such as earnings numbers. The implementation of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code of 2003 has somewhat reduced the degree of both accrual earnings and real management in MBOs, but since then other manipulation techniques (related to production costs and asset revaluations) are more frequently used, which may be induced by the fact that these manipulation methods are more difficult to detect.
Introduction
Prior to management buyouts (MBOs), managers have an incentive to deflate the reported earnings numbers by accounting manipulation in the hope of lowering the subsequent stock price. If they succeed, they will be able to acquire (a large part of) the company on the cheap.
It is important to note that accounting manipulation in a buyout transaction may have severe consequences for the shareholders who sell out in the transaction: if the earnings distortion is reflected in the stock price, the stock price decline cannot be undone and the wealth loss of shareholders is irreversible if the company goes private subsequent to the buyout. Mispriced stock and false financial statements are still issues frequently mentioned when MBO transactions are evaluated. The UK's Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2006) ranks market abuse as one of the highest risks and suggests more intensive supervision of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). The concerns about mispriced buyouts are therefore a motive to test empirically whether earnings numbers are manipulated preceding buyout transactions.
Whereas the manipulation of financial statements prior to US MBOs has occasionally been detected in the academic literature over the past 20 years, we wonder whether accounting manipulation has occurred/still occurs in the second most important buyout market, namely that of the UK which is subject to different regulation and enforcement. We focus on the period since the start of the second LBO wave: 1997-onwards, which also coincides with the tightened corporate governance regulation (Guo et al., 2011) and enhanced reporting integrity (Botsari and Meeks, 2008) . We investigate two types of incentives for accounting manipulation in an LBO/MBO context. On one hand, managers may opt to present lower earnings if they are likely to participate in a prospective buyout transaction and will subsequently stay with the company. Negative earnings manipulation or earnings understatement is induced by the management engagement incentives. On the other hand, managers' incentive to misrepresent the earnings may be related to the financing of the future transaction. A typical LBO is traditionally financed with 60 to 90 percent debt (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009 ) -although this ratio has decreased to 50-60 percent since the recent financial crises. Low earnings (cash flow) numbers would reduce the amount of debt that a firm could bear at the relevering stage. Thus, managers who prepare a corporate sale by means of an LBO could manipulate earnings upwards in order to facilitate the buyout transaction -this is the external financing incentive. We distinguish here between MBOs whereby the pre-transaction management remains (financially) involved in the company subsequent to the transaction, and LBOs which we define as transactions without subsequent involvement of the incumbent management.
We not only concentrate on whether and why manipulation occurs but also on how earnings manipulation can occur by considering accrual management and real earnings management preceding the buyouts. Whereas accrual-based earnings management activities have no cash flow consequences, real earnings management refers to managerial activities which deviate from normal business practices and affect cash flows. We advance an industry-adjusted buyout-specific approach to capture the abnormal accounting numbers which proxy for accounting manipulation. In this context, we also study asset revaluations and transfers across reserve accounts on the balance sheet as a means of external financing manipulation.
The contributions to the literature are the following: First, there is little evidence on earnings manipulation outside the US buyout market, which raises the question as to whether dishonest accounting management is a phenomenon that other markets also suffer from?
Moreover, most studies have examined a sample belonging to the first MBO wave of the 1980s. Since then, the corporate governance regulation has been tightened (Guo et al, 2011) , and accounting standards became stricter in terms of transparency. For instance, in 2003, the revised Combined Code on Corporate Governance (currently called: the UK Corporate Governance Code) was implemented to improve financial reporting quality which raises the question whether or not accounting management is still that pronounced? Second, earnings manipulation comprising accrual management and real earnings management are analyzed in the context of buyout transactions, but the management may also resort to (tangible) asset manipulation (asset revaluations and transfers between reserve accounts). We thus investigate multiple manipulation techniques. Third, while raw abnormal accruals are usually calculated in the earnings management literature, they still comprise accruals influenced by specific corporate events and are different across different industries. Therefore, we adjust the raw abnormal accruals for the mean abnormal accruals of non-buyout firms of the same size-group, industry and ex ante performance. In addition to the traditional approach of contrasting buyout firms with a control group of non-buyout peers matched by firm characteristics, we contrast MBOs to LBOs as both types of buyouts induce different incentives for earnings manipulation. We hence compare the adjusted abnormal accounting figures of MBOs and LBOs. In so doing, we provide a test of accounting manipulation directly attributable to manager engagement incentives around the buyout event. Fourth, we analyze the underlying incentives for accounting manipulation and address the endogeneity issue of using the (ex-post) buyout type as a proxy for management engagement incentives by means of a two-staged IV approach. In the first stage, we model the decision to undertake an MBO or LBO using firm characteristics in the year proceeding the accounting manipulation year. In the second stage, we use the predicted MBO as a proxy for the management engagement incentive. We show that the causality is more likely to flow from the management engagement decision to the accounting manipulation decision.
We report the following findings: First, downward earnings management, both in terms of accrual and real earnings management, has been widely used in the UK since the start of the second buyout wave. Our industry-adjusted approach shows that the abnormal accrual figures are significantly more negative than those of non-buyout firms of the same industry and with similar size and ex ante performance. For buyout companies, the accruals decline in the manipulation year (the year prior to the deal announcement) whereas non-buyout companies are generally subject to positive accrual management as positive manipulation can affect managers' bonuses and the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts' expectations which may trigger a positive market reaction. Second, in MBOs, there is evidence of more real earnings manipulation (through production costs and sales revenues) than in LBOs. The external financing incentive -upward earnings manipulation increases the relevering potential in a buyout transaction -is not supported by our analysis. This may be explained by the fact that during the second LBO wave it was easier to attract external funds, considering the growth in the high yield bond market (by more than 600% since 1997). Credit market conditions rather than company characteristics may determine the financing capacity. Third, besides income statement manipulation, we show that managers are more likely to revaluate assets upwards, the magnitude and frequency is small. The evidence on asset reserves revaluation is consistent with insignificance of the external financing incentive. Fourth, the revised Corporate Governance Code of 2003 has had a significant impact on both accrual and real earnings manipulation. Accrual management did indeed decline since 2003. In contrast, the other manipulation techniques (regarding production costs and asset revaluations) are more frequently used since the tightening of the corporate governance regulation, which may be induced by the fact that these manipulation methods are more difficult to detect. This finding is consistent with some recent US evidence: after the adoption of SOX, companies shifted from accrual management to real earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008) . However, in MBOs, both accrual and real earnings manipulations are reduced after 2003. Overall, our findings imply that more stringent accounting rules have been effective to curb dishonest earnings management in management buyout transactions.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 describes how accounting management is measured and explains the empirical setup. Section 4 reports the sample selection criteria and discusses the descriptive statistics. The empirical results and robustness analyses are set out in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Literature overview and hypotheses
The US literature on accounting manipulation states that downward earnings management prior to MBOs is expected. In addition to income statement manipulation, we also examine balance sheet manipulation, more specifically: asset reserves revaluation (reflected by revaluations of tangible assets, the recording of increments (or decrements) in the equity account, and changes to the debt-to-equity ratio) preceding the buyouts. The reason for this dual approach is that, as Dechow et al. (2010) suggest, managers can make a variety of accounting choices which are inspired by different (misrepresentation) objectives.
Accounting manipulation

Earnings manipulation
In the context of the surging MBO activity of the 1980s in the US, virtually every buyout proposal was contested by shareholders claiming that they were cheated (Longstreth, 1984) .
Even through recommendations by investment banks and approval by independent directors were sought to evaluate the fairness of buyout transactions, doubts about accounting manipulation remained. DeAngelo (1986) did not detect accrual manipulation preceding US MBOs, but Perry and Williams (1994) who worked with a larger sample and utilized a regression-based model to capture discretionary accruals more accurately, did document downward accrual management. Wu (1997) showed that on average, earnings manipulation prior to MBOs decreased the acquisition price by 18.6%. While managers may have good personal reasons to manipulate earnings downwards, they also have incentives to manipulate earnings upwards. Fisher and Louis (2008) stated that managers overstated their earnings to get favorable debt contract terms at the buyout, but for US MBOs, downward accrual management dominated. Ang et al. (2010) confirm that managers tend to manipulate earnings downwards if they continue to have a strong equity tie with the targets after the buyouts.
Managers have stronger incentives to understate the earnings numbers in MBOs relative to LBOs. We hereby define an MBO as a leveraged buyout transaction whereby at least one of the pre-buyout managers financially participates in the transaction and stays in the company subsequent to the buyout. According to our LBO definition, the incumbent management (prior to the LBO) will no longer be involved with the company subsequent to the transaction.
From an ownership perspective, managers are (co-)acquirers of MBO targets such that earnings manipulation resulting in a lower purchase price leads to self-dealing. In order to win the support of the management, financial sponsors in pursuit of target companies usually send a "love letter" which comprises an invitation to the current management team for further discussion and the intention to employ them after sealing the deal (Das and Chon, 2011) . So, managers intending to stay in the firm have incentives to facilitate the transaction (although the management's personal benefits in MBOs will largely exceed those in LBOs). Frequently, a ratchet is offered to the management which increases their post-transaction ownership stake in order to motivate them to achieve strong periodic performance and good exit returns 2 2 A ratchet is an incentive mechanism which either offers managers a modest equity stake if managers meet (Renneboog et al., 2007; Yates and Hinchliffe, 2010 The implicit assumption underlying this hypothesis is that market participants cannot differentiate between earnings arising from business activities and manipulated earnings. In general, Bradshaw et al. (2001) find that even sophisticated investors, such as auditors and financial analysts, fail to detect accrual anomaly. Likewise, Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2007) show that bond investors do not correctly price accruals. Hence, the possibility of detecting manipulation seems rather low. Moreover, if manipulation is found out, managers could more easily justify downward manipulation than upward manipulation by referring to the principle of accounting conservatism.
Buyout transactions largely rely on external financing, a combination of senior loans, subordinated loans, and high-yield bonds. Ample evidence points out that the debt financier is prone to use earnings numbers to predict future cash flows and make credit decisions (Palepu et al., 2000) . In a buyout setting, Fischer and Louis (2008) find that managers who need large external funds to finance an MBO are more likely to report less negative abnormal accruals, although this effect is tempered when fixed assets serve as collateral. Hence, the external financing incentive can be formulated as: Earnings management is negatively related to the amount of external financing needed in a buyout. The relation is mitigated when the buyout company has more fixed assets that can serve as collateral (H2).
Alternatively, Axelson et al. (2013) contend that managers issue more debts when the credit market is overvalued. Therefore, a high bond market spread, as a proxy for credit market conditions, is a better predictor of buyout leverage than the earnings numbers. Shivdasani and Wang (2011) confirm that the boom in buyout transactions from 2004 to 2007 was fueled by the fast growth in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
Asset revaluation manipulation
ex-ante specified performance targets after buyouts (Renneboog et al., 2007) and/or entitles managers to receive a higher proportion of the exit proceeds if an exit is achieved beyond a particular 'hurdle' return rate for investors (Yates and Hinchliffe, 2010) .
Whereas the literature on accounting manipulation prior to MBOs traditionally concentrates on earnings management (income statement manipulation) because earnings reflect current performance and are used in valuation exercises, balance sheet manipulation through 'asset revaluation' may also occur. This can also enable a target company to attract more debt to finance the deal. While earnings management is used to influence the stock price, asset revaluation manipulation is mainly used to affect the level of external borrowing.
Asset revaluation may be used more often in the UK than in the US: since the implementation of FRS3 in 1993, companies are encouraged to revalue fixed assets 3 on the ground that they provide useful and value relevant information 4 . The difference between an asset's old carrying value and its revaluation is credited to a revaluation reserve account on the balance sheet. The depreciation charges are subsequently calculated based on the revalued assets.
Moreover, the gains or losses on the sale of previously revaluated assets are calculated referring to the new revaluation value instead of historical cost. Hence, the new asset revaluation practice has the following implications: (i) If assets are upwards (downwards) revalued, it increases (decreases) the equity amount via the revaluation reserve account on the balance sheet and thus lowers (boosts) the debt-to-equity ratio; (ii) If assets are revalued upwards, there is no contemporaneous effect on the income statement, but it will lower gains from a future asset disposal as the inflated carrying value will serve as the benchmark value.
Meanwhile, the upward revaluation increases the future depreciation charges. If assets are revalued downwards, the net revaluation decrement is expensed on the current income statement.
To sum up, revaluations affect the current debt-to-equity ratio on the balance sheet, the future depreciation on the income statement, and the future gains from asset sales on the income statement. Revaluations are discretionary in nature, because managers can decide whether,
when, and what amounts of assets are revalued in financial statements (Lin and Peasnell, 2000) .
3 Intangible asset revaluation is also permitted, but UK companies hardly use it (Aboody et al., 1999 At first glance, in a highly leveraged buyout, managers have an incentive to revalue assets upwards in order to be able to show a lower leverage ratio which enables them to attract the required amount of debt financing at favorable borrowing terms. Easton et al.'s (1993) survey shows that a key motivation to revalue assets is indeed such debt contract considerations.
However, these current gains from upward assets revaluation induce a cost, namely the reduction of a buyout target's future gains. First, the accumulated assets revaluation reserves exhaust companies' possibilities to further use this manipulation tool subsequent to the buyout as the amount of upward revaluation is not unlimited. Second, upward manipulation increases depreciation and decreases net income in the near future. Moreover, as Wright et al. (2001) report, buyout targets often restructure by divesting non-core businesses to remove downside inefficiency. The inflated assets will lower the gains from future asset sales, which will also exert a negative impact on earnings. The resulting lower earnings will directly influence managers' bonuses and ratchets. It is also noteworthy that upward revaluation is also costly, as valuation fees are paid to independent valuators to certify the revaluation.
Therefore, a manager has to weigh the costs of future gains against the current benefits.
However, in LBOs (as we define them), managers will not be involved subsequent to the buyout and will hence not bear the future cost of upward revaluation. Therefore, we expect that: assets are revalued upwards to a larger degree in LBOs than in MBOs (H3).
Driven by external financing needs, managers could manipulate asset reserves in LBOs/MBOs. However, if the external financing capacity of a target relies more on general credit conditions than on its own credit characteristics, there may not be a need to manipulate asset reserves. Notably, our sample period coincides with the boom of the high-yield bond market and of CDOs. Therefore, easy access to the debt market may dominate the impact of the balance sheet manipulation.
Accounting manipulation proxies and empirical models
Earnings management proxies
Managers use accounting procedures and estimates that are conform to GAAP in order to present specific earnings numbers and influence equity valuation (Erickson and Wang, 1999) .
It is rather easy to change the earnings by means of accrual manipulation. The presented bottom-line results can also be influenced by real earnings management of which the advantages (relative to accrual management) are: (i) it is less likely to draw auditors' and regulators' attention because real earnings management is related to operating decisions and (ii) there is no manipulation limit. Graham et al.'s (2005) survey reveals that executives are more willing to use earnings management through real activities than accrual management.
Hence, we will investigate both types of earnings management.
Accrual management proxies
To measure discretionary (abnormal or manipulated) accruals, regression-based models have been developed for which Dechow et al. (1995) and Balatbat and Lim (2003) demonstrate that the modified-Jones model performs best 5 . Still, Kothari et al. (2005) performance-matched approach whereby we match the buyout target with a non-buyout company with the same two-digit SIC code and with the closest performance in the year of the buyout. To recapitulate, we start from total accruals and apply the following: (i) the regression-based model removes the normal accruals from the actual total accruals, the performance-adjustment subtracts the performance-related abnormal accruals, and the mean-adjustment or matched approach excludes the non-event abnormal accruals; (ii) Likewise, the performance-matching removes the normal accruals and makes a performance 5 DeAngelo (1986) uses a random walk model to calculate abnormal accruals and thus assumes that changes in the nondiscretionary part of total accruals equal zero. However, Dechow (1992) empirically shows that there is a significant negative serial correlation in accruals changes. Jones (1991) develops a regression model to predict normal accruals and hence calculate abnormal accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) modify the Jones model by subtracting changes in receivables (which are not exogenous) from changes in sales to predict normal working capital accruals. Dechow and Dichev (2002) use the operating cash flow to calculate abnormal accruals, but this operating cash flow based model only captures working capital induced abnormal accruals and ignores long-term abnormal accruals.
and non-event accrual adjustment. As a consequence, the remaining part of the abnormal accruals (calculated by means of either approach) captures the industry-adjusted buyout-specific manipulation.
The performance-adjusted modified -Jones regression model (PAMJ)
To measure the PAMJ model, we cross-sectionally estimate the discretionary accruals for each year using all firm-year observations with the same two-digit SIC code. There are important advantages of this approach relative to a time-series one, because PAMJ (i) imposes less restrictions on data -it does not require long time-period accounting information;
(ii) partially controls for industry-wide factors which affect total accruals; and (iii) allows the coefficients to vary across time (Kasnik, 1999) . Furthermore, Peasnell et al. (2000) state that the cross-sectional model is more able to capture the magnitudes of accrual management. The expectations model is measured as follows:
where, for fiscal year t and firm i, TAAC stands for the total accruals defined as represents the total book value of assets. Kothari et al. (2005) demonstrates that using contemporary ROA i,t produces less miss-specified tests relative to lagged ROA i,t-1 . All variables, except ROA i,t , are scaled by lagged total assets to mitigate heteroskedasticity in residuals. The normal accruals, NTAAC i,t , are then calculated as follows:
Hence, the predicted raw abnormal total accruals RAW_ABN_TAAC i,t are the difference between observed total accruals and normal total accruals:
7 Sales minus cost of sales and SG&A expenses give the operating income; adjusting for other operations related revenues and expenses leads to Profit before Interest; minus net interest payable yields the profit before tax; minus tax gives Profit after Tax; and minus minority interest yields the Earnings (or Profit) before Extraordinary items. 8 Hribar and Collins (2002) state that accrual estimates calculated from balance sheets can be contaminated by measurement error and therefore prefer accruals from cash flow statement. For instance, M&As increase net current assets on the balance sheet, but do not affect the income statement account. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) confirm that the balance sheet approach is biased to upward earnings management and the amount of discretionary accrual is overestimated.
T A A C i, t R A W _ A B N _ T A A C = -N T A A C i, t i,t A s s e ts i, t -1 (3)
To remove the non-event specific abnormal accruals, we subtract the mean abnormal accruals of the control observations (firms in the same year and with the same two-digit SIC code) from the raw abnormal accruals, which yields the industry-adjusted buyout-specific abnormal accruals:
For our robust tests, we will also subtract the mean abnormal accruals of the control observations in the same size group within an industry from RAW_ABN_TAAC i,t and label it as MadjSize_ABN_TAAC i,t .
The performance-matched modified -Jones regression model (PMMJ)
An alternative approach to control for performance consists of adjusting the estimated abnormal accruals by subtracting the estimated abnormal accruals of a performance-matched company. While the notation remains the same as above, we first estimate the expectations model without a performance regressor.
which yields the normal accruals: 
and enables us to calculate the predicted raw abnormal accruals:
T A A C i , t R A W _ A B N _ T A A C = -N T A A C i , t i , t A s s e t s i , t -1 (7)
We then select for each firm in the buyout year a matched firm from the non-buyout companies with the same two-digit SIC code and with the closest ROA i,t . Raw abnormal accruals are calculated for both the buyout samples and the control observations and the difference comprises the industry-adjusted buyout-specific abnormal accruals:
Real earnings management proxies
The three most common types of real earnings manipulation comprise: (i) Sales manipulation;
(ii) Production manipulation; and (iii) Expenses manipulation.
Sale manipulation occurs when managers (temporarily) influence earnings and thus the bottom line earnings numbers by changing the sales price or/and credit terms. In a buyout context, managers attempt to lower the sales and thus the earnings by imposing a sales price premium or/and offering less lenient credit terms. For instance, by temporarily reducing lenient credit terms, customers may delay their purchases in the current period. Consequently, the sales decline and the earnings are deflated, but given the tightening of the credit terms, the collection of current period's sales increases which boosts the cash inflow. All in all, the effect of this type of sales manipulation is expected to result in a higher level of operating cash flow.
Prior to the buyout, managers can slow down production in order to reduce net earnings. On the one hand, by producing fewer units, the fixed costs are spread over a small number of units and the fixed cost per unit augments and, since the production is below its optimal scale, the marginal cost per unit rises as well. Hence, the total cost per unit increases, which implies higher reported cost of goods and lower operating margins. On the other hand, the other production and holding costs for inventory decline. As a result, the total production costs, a sum of the cost of goods and changes in inventory, are reduced as the decline in the latter is expected to dominate the increase in the former (Roychowdhury, 2006 ) which leads to a low ratio of production costs to sales.
Finally, the management can also increase the discretionary expenses by e.g. expanding the selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) to make the current earnings decline 9 .
Our approach to estimate the abnormal real activities manipulation is also based on cross-sectional models. We use both performance-adjusted and performance-matched methods to derive industry-adjusted buyout-specific real earnings management proxies.
Sales Manipulation
Our expectations model is formulated as follows:
s s e t s A s s e t s A s s e t s A s s e t s
with all the variables as defined above. We obtain the normal operating cash flows (NOCF i,t ) by means of the β-estimates from the above equation : 
To remove the non-event specific abnormal cash flows, we subtract the mean abnormal operating cash flows of the control firms (of the same year and with the same two-digit SIC code) from the raw operating cash flows, which yields the industry-adjusted event-specific abnormal operating cash flows:
As before, we also use two alternative calculations: we subtract the mean abnormal operating cash flows of the control firms in the same size group within the same industry from RAW_ABN_OCF i,t and label it MadjSize_ABN_OCF i,t . We also use a performance-matched approach: a matched firm is selected by a non-buyout company in the same two-digit SIC code and year with the closest ROA i,t . Raw abnormal operating cash flows are calculated for both the sample and the control observations. The difference is the buyout-specific abnormal operating cash flows:
Production manipulation
We take the following production cost expectation model as our basis:
where, for fiscal year t and firm i, PROD i,t is the production cost and equals the sum of the Cost of Goods (COGS i,t ) and the change in Inventory (∆INVENTORY i,t ). The normal production cost is calculated as:
t i NPROD , is the normal production cost, calculated from the parameter estimates of the expectations model. As before, to remove the non-event specific abnormal production cost, we subtract the mean abnormal production cost of the control firms (of the same year and with the same two-digit SIC code) from the raw production cost. The industry-adjusted event-specific abnormal production cost is then:
Asset revaluation manipulation.
Asset revaluation is calculated as the change in revaluation reserves 11 on the balance sheet (Black et al., 1998; Cheng and Lin, 2009) . Asset revaluation reserves' reduction (inflation) in the manipulation year implies downward (upward) revaluation. As revaluations are industry-specific, we further subtract the industry's average revaluation or the average revaluation by the same size group within the same industry from the raw asset revaluation numbers to capture the industry-adjusted buyout-specific abnormal revaluation. As changes in asset reserves may reflect transfers among different reserve accounts, we collect detailed information on revaluation reserves from annual reports and record the frequency of four different types of revaluation while considering transferring reserves: (i) "No change"
indicates that the asset revaluation reserves remain the same in both the manipulation and the prior year; (ii) "Upward revaluation" indicates that there are overstated revaluation activities in the manipulation year (relative to the year before the manipulation year); (iii) "Downward revaluation" captures the opposite case, and (iv) "Transfer" refers to the change in revaluation reserves arising from a transfer between the revaluation reserves account and other reserves accounts 12 .
The determinants of earnings management
To analyze the determinants of earnings management, we take the above proxies based on accruals, production, or sales manipulation and relate them to a set of firm, transaction, and industry characteristics which include the choice of the buyout type (MBO versus LBO). This induces a problem as the buyout type choice is not exogenous and can be influenced by the 10 We also use two alternative measures: the mean abnormal production cost of the control observations in the same size group within the same industry is subtracted from RAW_ABN_PROD i,t and label it as MadjSize_ABN_PROD i,t . We use a performance-matched approach: a matched firm is selected by a non-buyout company in the same two-digit SIC code and year with the closest ROA i,t . Raw abnormal production cost is calculated for both sample and control observations. The difference is proxied as the event-specific abnormal production cost: Aboody et al. (1999) collect revaluation numbers from companies' annual reports and cross check these numbers with data in Datastream. They report that only three discrepancies related to the 5485 firm-year observations. 12 For instance, Usborne plc underwent buyout in 1998. The 1997 The (1996 annual report showed £32000 (£84000) in the revaluation reserves account. The decline in revaluation reserves by £52000 is not due to revaluation, but arose from transferring out of revaluation reserves account to the P&L reserves account. Although a revaluation decrease could be noted, the sum of the revaluation reserves account and P&L reserves account remained the same and the equity was is not influenced by such transfers.
degree of earnings management as well as some firm specific characteristics such as the management's equity stake or the degree of board independence. Given that the realized MBO as a proxy for the management engagement incentive is endogenous determined, we adopt a two-stage instrument variable method. The Zephyr database reveals that the deal initiation takes place almost one year prior to the actual buyout announcement. Furthermore, Ang et al.'s (2010) empirical evidence confirms that the causality is more likely to flow from the buyout decision to earnings manipulation. Therefore, the first stage regression models the buyout choice and the predicted buyout choice will be included in the second stage regression as an explanatory variable of the degree of earnings manipulation.
The MBO versus LBO choice in year t-1 is a function of the variables at year t-2: Assets i,t-2 is total debt over total assets, and Size i,t-2 is the logarithm of total assets.
The choice of variables included in this first stage regression is affected by the reasons for the buyout that are usually mentioned in the official offer documents. As a key reason is "to simplify the management structure to bring it more in line with companies' prospects", we include managerial ownership. Another frequently mentioned reason for a buyout is "to remove costs associated with a listing" as companies with illiquid stocks are not able to attract sufficient investor recognition and the listing costs may therefore outweigh the benefits. Illiquidity is often linked with high ownership concentration which implies that shareholders intending to dispose of their shares may have little alternative than to sell to the management or a buyout sponsor (Fidrmuc et al., 2013) . Therefore, we expect that low visibility (proxied by analyst following and type of market listing) positively correlates to
MBOs. The board needs to issue an independent evaluation of possible buyout choices and make a recommendation to investors. Therefore, a more independent board and a stronger ownership stake held by the non-executive directors may imply less collusion with the management, which may reduce the probability of an MBO. Lastly, we also include the cash balance and leverage ratio in the first stage regression.
In the second stage, we replace the MBO dummy by the predicted MBO from the first-step regression.
e d _ D u m _ M B O + β D u m _ E x t e r n a l F i n a n c i n g + β S P P E + β D u m _ E x t e r n a l F i n a n c i n g * S P P E + β N O A I N V R E C + Y e a r F i x e d e f f e c t s + I n d u s t r y F i x e d e f f e c t s + ε
The dependent variable Abnormal i,t-1 stands for MadjSize_ABN_TAAC i,t-1 (or
and
MadjSize_ABN_PROD i,t-1 which are abnormal accruals/operating cash flows/production costs of the buyout companies adjusted for the mean accruals/operating cash flow/production costs of the same size group. The management engagement incentive variable is proxied by Pred_Dum_MBO i,t . We expect a negative coefficient on this variable because in MBOs managers are expected to manipulate the earnings downwards and benefit from a subsequent low purchase price (relative to LBOs). The variable Dum_External Financing i,t 13 proxies for the external financing incentive and equals one when the target raises external funds at the transaction. The indicator variable is expected to have a positive sign, as the external financing ability will depend on positive earnings and thus mitigate the downward manipulation. SPPE i,t-2 (property, plant and equipment (PPE)) scaled by the beginning total assets) captures the availability of tangible assets that can serve as collateral. The internal manipulation capacity is captured by the net operating assets (NOA i,t-2 ), which is equity minus cash and marketable securities plus total debt (at the beginning of the year), divided by total 13 We use the dummy variable to ensure the proxy is not driven by the type of financing and extreme values of external funds. Moreover, some transactions only mention that they have external borrowing without releasing the exact amount.
sales (of the previous year). The larger the accumulated NOA i,t-2 , the lower the possibility to manipulate accruals. The nature of accrual accounting indicates that the total amount of accruals is fixed in the long run. Therefore, managers' opportunistic manipulation in one period has a reverse effect on manipulation in subsequent periods (Barton and Simko, 2002) .
When earnings are manipulated upwards by accruals, the value of the net assets on the balance sheet increases. All else being equal, the overstated net assets become less efficient at generating a given level of sales in the following periods, which explains the negative relationship between the level of net operating assets and accrual manipulation. The level of the stock of inventories and receivables (INVREC i, ) captures the managerial flexibility to manipulate real activities. The stock of inventories and receivables is positively correlated with the flexibility to manipulate real earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006) . We also add time and industry fixed-effects. All the aforementioned accounting variables are lagged; variable definitions are presented in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Data description
Data source and sample selection
This study comprises all completed whole-company UK buyouts that occurred in the period We collect a total of 407 buyout transactions and retain 168 14 public-to-private transactions which satisfy the following criteria:
We retain 353 whole-company public-to-private buyouts (PtP buyouts): 14 private-to-private buyouts and 32 divisional buyouts are dropped for reasons of data limitations. Eight companies that still remained public companies were also not included in the final database.
Missing data in Datastream reduced the sample to 299 buyouts.
We excluded the financial services industry (SIC codes 6000-7000) and the regulated industries (SIC codes 4400-5000), which reduced the sample to 233.
We faced problems with availability or quality of (accounting) information (in spite of disposing of the offer documents) and reduced the sample to 199 (ten companies had no SIC code; for twelve firms the net CF information was unavailable; ten firms lacked information on receivables; and two did not disclose any information on PPE).
As small companies are exempt from external auditing, we exclude these three firms,
hence retaining a sample of 196 firms.
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The inability to find a matching control firm leaves a sample of 178.
We dropped ten observations, because we required at least 10 observations in each two-digit SIC industry per year to ensure the statistic power in the cross-sectional regressions. In the remaining 168 observations, we have all the necessary data to calculate the various accounting manipulation proxies for 163 transactions.
Data description
Panel A of Table 2 (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) [Insert Table 2 about here]
The total assets of the average sample firm equal GBP 171.34 million in the year prior to the buyout. MBOs are relatively smaller, faster growing, less levered, but more cash-rich companies than LBOs. In two thirds of our buyout sample, at least one incumbent manager is involved in the transaction and stays on subsequent to the buyout-when we label the transaction as an MBO. MBOs are associated with a large ex ante equity stakes held by managers (18.3% versus only 6.0% in LBOs) and the management is more frequently the largest shareholder. Institutional ownership concentration does not differ between MBOs and
LBOs. LBOs have a higher proportion of independent directors than MBOs (47.82% versus 43.68%) and are followed by twice as many analysts 16 .
Results
Earnings manipulation
Accrual management
We first calculate normal (or expected) accruals by means of the performance-adjusted modified-Jones model (Panel A of Table 3 ) which is based on 163 cross-sectional regressions.
The factor most influencing the expected total accruals is the scaled PPE (β 2 ), the long-term component of total accruals. Expectedly, this parameter estimate is negative, because PPE is related to depreciation which negatively contributes to total accruals. Of the 163 cross-sectional regressions, 87.20% of the scaled PPE's coefficients are significant at the conventional levels. The coefficient on the change in net sales (β 1 ) is negative and insignificant in more than half of regressions. More importantly, ROA i,t plays a significantly positive role (β 3 ) as a control variable, which justifies the performance adjustment in the modified-Jones model. The concern that ROA i,t partially captures the effect of sales is not substantiated, as their correlation is low and insignificant. The model's mean adjusted R 2 for the 163 cross-sectional expectation models amounts to 47.2% (significantly higher than the non-performance-adjusted Jones model with an R 2 of only 27.0%).
When we compare the real total accruals with the predicted ones from Panel A, resulting in the raw abnormal total accruals (RAW_ABN_TAAC) of Panel B of Table 3 , we observe that buyout companies have negative total raw accruals (-3%). This degree of downward accrual management is comparable with the US literature (Perry and Williams, 1994; Fisher and Louis, 2008) . Both MBOs and LBOs have negative accrual management (-3% and -2%, respectively, but the difference is not significant; Panel B of Table 3 ). When we adjust the raw abnormal accruals for the industry-mean total accruals or for the mean of the same industry size group, we can draw two conclusions: (i) the abnormal accrual figures become significantly more negative: for all buyout companies, they decline from -3% to -12%. This implies that non-buyout companies are generally subject to positive accrual management (by
9% of the assets). This finding is unsurprising, because positive manipulation can affect managers' bonuses and the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts' expectations which may trigger a positive market reaction. (ii) The difference in industry-adjusted abnormal accruals of MBOs and LBOs is striking: downward accrual management is twice as high in MBOs (-15%) than in LBOs (-7%).
In sum, from the analysis of the industry-adjusted buyout-specific accruals approaches, we [Insert Table 3 about here]
As a robustness check, we use a performance-matched modified-Jones regression model, which controls for the effect of performance on accruals by assigning to each target a non-buyout counterpart from the same industry and a performance profile that is similar in the manipulation year. The difference in abnormal accruals of the buyout targets and that of control companies yields peer-controlled abnormal accruals. The results of this analysis yields very similar results 17 : for both MBOs and LBOs, the downward accruals manipulation is significantly negative, but the manipulation in MBOs is even much larger (about eight times) than in LBOs.
Real earnings management
We turn to real earnings management and focus on sales and production manipulation. The expectations model for the former is presented in Panel A of Table 4 . The contemporaneous sales are, as expected, strongly positively correlated to the operating cash flows (OCF), and so is ROA. The explanatory power of the model is high with an average adjusted R 2 of 73.17%. Panel B of Table 4 indicates that the abnormal operating cash flows are positive for both MBOs and LBOs targets, which is in line with the prediction that managers will delay sales to depress net income by using real earnings management. For instance, a reduction in lenient credit terms will decrease the sales volumes and therefore lead to low earnings number, but will increase the collection of current sales' receipts and thus raise the level of OCF. We observe that sales manipulation is carried out in MBOs (the four proxies are statistically significantly different from zero), but the evidence for LBOs is weaker. This finding supports hypothesis 1 that managers manipulate earnings downward by delaying sales.
One further point regarding our industry-adjusted buyout-specific approaches needs to be made: since both the industry-mean adjusted OCF and the same industry-size group adjusted OCF are lower than the raw OCF, it implies that the industry peers (the non-MBO and non-LBO firms) engage in negative sales manipulation, which is used to boost earnings numbers. This is consistent with the motive of positive accrual management used by the industry peers for increasing the bonus or meeting/beating analyst forecast.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In relation to production manipulation, we observe that sales are a key predictor of the production costs (Panel A of Table 5 further supports hypothesis 1, in that negative production manipulation occurs prior to buyouts, which leads to lower earnings figures. That is, managers intend to slow down production to manage earnings downwards. We also disclose that MBOs are related to significant under-production manipulation, while production manipulation in LBOs does not occur according to the industry-adjusted buyout-specific and the matching-adjusted approaches. Buyout targets decrease production while industry competitors increase production to inflate the earnings numbers, which is consistent with the role of positive accrual management and negative sales manipulation.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
In sum, in addition to the downward accrual management, we present further evidence on negative real earnings management preceding buyout transactions. What is more, MBOs are associated with more negative earnings manipulation relative to LBOs. Hypothesis 1 is supported by both accrual management and real earnings management.
Since accrual management and real earnings management may be correlated, we report the correlation matrix in Table 6 . Abnormal accruals and abnormal cash flows are significantly negatively correlated, which implies that companies are engaging in accrual management and real earnings management at the same time. Likewise, the negative correlation between abnormal cash flows and abnormal production costs suggests that both types of real earnings management are initiated by the average MBO.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Asset revaluation
Whereas in LBOs, upward asset revaluation takes place, this is not the case in MBOs (as reflected in the abnormal revaluation numbers of Panel A of Table 7 ). Given that asset revaluation is industry-specific (industries with high capital intensity can revalue their assets to a larger extent), we control for industry effects by adjusting the raw figures for (i) the industry mean; (ii) the mean of the same industry-size group, and (iii) peer-effects by employing a matched control sample of non-buyouts. These three adjustments consistently show that managers do not manipulate the value of the assets through revaluation in MBOs, but do so in case of LBOs. In the context of the results of the previous subsection, a logical explanation is that MBO managers intend to keep corporate value as low as possible. In contrast, LBO managers who anticipate that they will not be involved in the post-LBO phase can facilitate the buyout by revaluing the assets upwards which reduces the debt-to-equity ratio and in turn increases the debt capacity of the un-levered transaction.
When we dig deeper into the components of the asset revaluation reserves and distinguish between pure asset revaluation changes and the changes following the transfers of asset revaluation reserves to other reserve accounts, we show in Panel B of Table 7 that although MBO managers have an incentive to revaluate their assets downwards, they do not do so in 70.30% of the cases. The main reason is that of these 70.30% of the MBOs, 87% are not able to decrease the revaluation reserves because their asset revaluation reserves were already at zero prior to the buyout.
In short, when we examine the abnormal revaluation reserves, LBOs are associated with more frequent upward revaluations than MBOs. This partially supports the Hypothesis 2 of external financing incentive: upward revaluations are used to increase the borrowing capacity by ex ante reducing the debt-to-equity ratio. It also provides evidence on Hypothesis 3 that LBOs are associated with more upward revaluation than MBOs. However, it should be noted that the evidence is not very strong as in absolute terms, neither the MBOs nor the LBOs frequently revalue their assets. The reason may be that when credit markets are booming, revaluations are not really necessary.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Robustness tests
To evaluate the robustness of our primary findings on accounting manipulation, we conduct four robustness checks.
First, it is possible that the management has made the manipulation decision not in the year or months prior to the buyout transaction but at an earlier time. Therefore, we measure all accounting manipulation proxies at a time preceding the transaction by more than one year (the fiscal year is then ending 13 to 24 months prior to the buyout). Overall, we hardly find Table 8 , we discover that active accrual manipulation was larger before the change in corporate governance regulation (the 1997-2003 subperiod), although it still takes place subsequent to 2003. In contrast, the other manipulation techniques (related to production costs and asset revaluations) are more frequently used after the change in the accounting regime, which may be induced by the fact that these manipulation methods are more difficult to detect. This finding is also consistent with US evidence: since the adoption of SOX, companies shift from accrual management to real earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008) . When we redo the above tests for the sample of MBOs only, we find that the above findings are upheld.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Third, we base our tests on the differences between the medians for the MBOs and LBOs (for the panels B of the Tables 3-5 and 7) and find that the results are very similar 19 .
Fourth, we also perform a time-series approach to estimate abnormal accruals, operating cash flows and production costs. For each individual buyout company, we run a time-series regression using company data over a six year period ending in the year before the manipulation year to measure the normal accruals, operating cash flows, and production costs, and hence both accrual and real earnings management. The limitation of this method is that a sufficiently long time series (we take at least six years) of accounting numbers prior to the manipulation period ought to be available for each firm in order to estimate the parameter coefficients. Although this approach reduces the sample size to 72 observations, we still find negative accrual management preceding MBOs.
The determinants of earnings manipulation
In this section, we concentrate on the question why firms resort to accounting manipulation:
does the management engagement incentive dominate or the external financing reason?
Managerial incentives versus external financing reasons
It is important to note that when we relate the earnings manipulation variables to the MBO/LBO dummy variable, the latter captures the ex ante probability of management engagement but measures it with error. Some companies consider an MBO but end up with an LBO which imposes a bias on the resulting coefficients from the probit models.
Furthermore, the type of buyout is not exogenous to the degree of earnings manipulation. To address these concerns, we make use of a stage instrumental variables method. The first-stage equation models the MBO choice and the second equation explains the accounting manipulation behavior. So, we test whether or not managers manipulate earnings when they perceive the buyout type. As suggested by Berry (2011) , an OLS model is preferred in the first stage even for an independent dummy variable, the reason being that only OLS estimation produces first stage residuals that are uncorrelated with the covariates and fitted values. As a robustness check, we will also employ a probit model for the first stage estimation following Wooldridge (2002) .
We choice a set of instrumental variables (IVs) based on the economic rationale underlying the buyouts: managerial ownership concentration, non-executive ownership concentration, and firm size. Panel A of Table 9 demonstrates that these IVs are significantly related to the MBO decision. The higher is the manager's equity investment in the target company, the higher probability of an MBO. When the level of non-executive ownership is higher and the target firm is larger, the company is more likely to undergo an LBO. Smaller firms are more likely to be acquired through an MBO. The Hausman endogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis that the realized buyout type is exogenous. A p-value of 0.26 from overindentifying restriction test indicates that at least one of the IVs is exogenous. To test the relevance of the IVs, the F-statistics are required to be larger than 10 to avoid weak IVs; our F-test amounts to 18.4 which implies that our IVs are characterized by a sufficiently large correlation with the endogenous regressor.
The main finding of the second stage is that the predicted MBO proxy is significantly negatively related to the abnormal accruals (Model (1) of Panel B of Table 9 ) and a positive relation with sales manipulation (Model (2)). Both these findings support Hypothesis 1 in that managers are more prone to participate in accounting manipulation in order to obtain a lower purchase price via both accrual and real earnings manipulation. In case of an MBO, the mean abnormal accruals is 18.4% of total assets lower than the accruals of firms of the same size group and within the same industry. This decrease leads to a decline in earnings by 30%, which is also economically significant. The external financing incentive does not emerge as a reason for accrual or real earnings manipulation. The reason for its insignificance may be that over the period 1997 to 2007 a fast-growing high-yield bond market emerged (the GBP 5.4
billion high-yield bond market of 1997, soared to 32 billion in 2007). Axelson et al. (2013) argue that the main robust predictor of buyout leverage consists of the credit market conditions of the high-yield bond market. Thus, our Hypothesis 2 on the external financing incentive is not upheld. The inactive revaluation frequency presented in Panel B of Table 7 is squared with this finding.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Robustness tests
To verify the results of the above subsection, we perform four robustness tests.
First, as an alternative dependent variable for accrual management, we use the performance-matched abnormal accruals (see Section 3). The perceived MBO probability still has a significantly negative impact on accrual manipulation (-0.151 in Model (1) of Table 10 ).
When we use either the raw abnormal operating cash flow (OCF) or the industry mean adjusted OCF as a proxy for sales manipulation, the perceived MBO remains positive and statistically significant (0.077 in Model (2)).
Second, we use two alternative estimation approaches. In the first stage, we use a probit model (rather than OLS) to predict the MBO likelihood and then use this predicted value as a regressor in the second stage. We confirm that the management engagement incentive plays a crucial role in negative accrual manipulation (Model (3)). We also apply a GMM IV approach and obtain a coefficient for the predicted MBO (-0.186 in Model (4)) which happens to be similar to that that of the two-stage approach (-0.184). As the standard errors are close, there is almost no efficiency gains from GMM approach relative to a two-staged method.
Third, we explore the effect of the enactment of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code of 2003 on both accrual and real activity manipulation. Model (5) of Table 10 shows that the implementation of the revised Code (as captured by the interaction term) mitigates the magnitude of manipulation in the case of an MBO. This suggests that the revised Code has improved the financial statement quality of a potentially problematic group of firms. Model (6) estimates the effect of the revised Code on sales manipulation. After the Code's revision, the real earnings manipulation in predicted MBOs is reduced as well. Taking these two pieces of evidence on accrual and real earning manipulations together, we could argue that the revised Code enhances the reporting integrity of suspected companies during the MBO event, which could therefore lead to more fair and transparent transactions.
Fourth, to verify that the causality goes from the buyout decision to earnings management, we estimate the realized buyout type dummy variable on different proxies for earnings manipulation in addition to factors influencing buyout choice. In untabulated results, we do not find any significant impact of earnings management on the choice of buyout type. The key determinants remain management equity ownership, non-executive shareholdings and company size.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate accounting manipulation prior to buyout transactions in the UK during the second buyout wave of 1997 to 2007 (when the buyout market collapsed following the banking crisis). We find that buyout targets engage in negative earnings manipulation, through both accrual management and real earnings management. Moreover, MBOs (wherein at least one member of the management team will be involved in the subsequent buyout) are associated with significantly more manipulation relative to LBOs. This is not unexpected:
when the management contemplates an MBO, negative earnings manipulation may negatively influence the acquisition price. This is evidence of managerial self-dealing. Our managerial engagement incentive hypothesis is strongly supported for UK MBOs. However, the external financing incentive (increasing earnings and cash flows may lead to higher valuation which may enable the firm to be acquired with more leverage) does not play a prominent role in our UK buyout setting. This finding is in line with the evidence of Axelson et al. (2013) in that the buyout leverage is not determined by standard capital structure factors.
Manipulation through inactive asset reserves revaluation is also consistent with the insignificance of the external financing incentive. We also document that the implementation of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code (of 2003) leads to increases in real earnings manipulation in general.
Our study extends the related research along four dimensions. First, while the first US LBO wave of the 1980s is well analyzed, little evidence is provided on the accounting manipulation during the second LBO wave and outside the US. We show that accounting manipulations ahead of the UK buyouts still prevail. Second, we advance an industry-adjusted buyout-specific approach to have a better proxy for accounting manipulation. The industry adjustment removes the common components of abnormal accounting numbers and allows for varied accounting discretion across industries. We further compare manipulation in MBOs and LBOs to examine buyout-event specific abnormal earnings behavior. Third, to explore the effect of competing incentives on accounting manipulation, we address the endogeneity issue of the ex-post buyout type by using the two-stage IV approach. We show that the causality goes from the decision of the buyout to accounting manipulation rather than vice versa. Fourth, we evaluate the policy effect of the revision of UK Corporate Governance Code on reporting quality. Even through self-interested managers still attempt to maximize their wealth through accounting manipulation, the magnitude of manipulation in MBOs is mitigated after the implementation of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code. In Panel B, the Industry-mean adjusted abnormal production costs (Madj_ABN_PROD t-1 ) are calculated by subtracting the mean abnormal production costs of the control firms (within the same two-digit SIC code and of the same year) from the raw abnormal production costs. The industry-size mean adjusted abnormal production costs (MadjSize_ABN_PROD t-1 ) are calculated by subtracting the mean abnormal production costs of the control firms (falling in the same industry-size group as the target firms) from the raw abnormal production costs of the target buyouts. The matching-adjusted abnormal production costs (ABN_PROD t-1 ) consist of the difference in abnormal production costs between the sample firms and the control firms. We match each target buyout with a non-buyout control company with the closest ROA i,t and in the same two-digit SIC code and year. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The raw abnormal asset revaluation (RAW_ABN_REVALUE t-1 ) in the manipulation year is measured as the change in asset revaluation reserves scaled by current total assets. We then subtract the industry average of the revaluation amount from the raw asset revaluation in order to obtain the industry mean-adjusted abnormal revaluation (Madj_ABN_REVALUE t-1 ). Industry-size mean adjusted abnormal asset revaluation (MadjSize_ABN_REVALUE t-1 ) is calculated by subtracting the mean asset revaluation of the control firms (falling in the same industry-size group) from the raw asset revaluation. ROA-matched asset revaluation (ABN_REVALUE t-1 ) is measured as the difference in asset revaluation between sample and control firms. The control firms are non-buyout companies with the same two-digit SIC code and the ROA i,t (considered in the same year as the sample firm) that is closest to the buyout target. In Panel B, "No change" signifies that the asset revaluation reserves remain the same in both the manipulation year and one year before. "Upward revaluation" indicates that there is an increase in revaluation activities from one year before the manipulation year to the next, while "Downward revaluation" captures the opposite case. "Transfer" reflects that the change in revaluation reserves are arising from transferring in or transferring out between revaluation reserves account and other reserves accounts. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Table 9 . ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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